Abstract: Our paper empirically considers two general hypotheses related to the literature of behavioral economics. First, we test the null hypothesis that individuals behave, on average, in a manner more consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis than with the idea of self-control in the face of hyperbolic discounting in their saving decisions. Second, along a variety of dimensions, we examine whether individuals exhibit Herbert Simon's notion that the goal formation of individuals will differ depending upon their relative levels of experience and knowledge. Perhaps there are significant differences among groups in their saving decisions that depend upon their apparent levels of intelligence, education, and knowledge. Finally, using a variety of individual-specific control variables, we test for robustness of the results. 
I. Introduction
Behavioral theorists augment neoclassical models in order to reconcile economic theory with observed phenomena. For example, Strotz (1956) models the timeinconsistency phenomenon. Herbert Simon pioneers the idea-summarized in Simon (1979) -that the goal formation of individuals will differ depending upon their relative levels of experience and knowledge, among other factors. More recently, Laibson (1997) finds that rational individuals with hyperbolic discounting of the future will opt for illiquid assets today in order to make it costly for their future selves to deviate from the saving pattern that appears optimal today. In a related paper, Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg (2001) offer empirical evidence that an awareness of hyperbolic discounting may influence individuals' saving decisions in ways predicted by Laibson. Akerlof (2002) summarizes this literature.
Our paper empirically considers two related hypotheses. First, we test the null hypothesis that individuals behave in a manner more consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis than with the idea of self-control in the face of hyperbolic discounting. Second, we examine whether individuals' choices differ depending upon their relative levels of experience and knowledge. Finally, using a variety of individualspecific control variables, we test for robustness of the results.
II. Literature Review
Under rational expectations, an individual would never overlook the time value of money in deciding when to receive income; in the absence of some other cost, sooner should always preferred to later. Nevertheless, university faculty with nine-month contracts often volunteer to spread their pay over the entire calendar year. In fact, Strotz (1956) himself states, "I select the option of having my . . . salary dispersed to me on a twelve-rather than on a nine-month basis, although I could use the interest!" (p. 173).
Using data from their own academic institutions, Archibald (1994) and Graham and Isaac (2002) have explored this phenomenon. Archibald believes that there are two possible explanations. First, Archibald posits that the costs-explicit and implicit-in taking one's salary up front may be larger than they appear at first glance. For example, if a professor opts to take her salary over nine months rather than twelve, then she will need to engage in additional budgeting activities during the year. Also, frontloading one's pay may require more frequent bank trips or balance transfers in order to execute the budgeting plan. If these costs are not small, it may be perfectly rational for a professor to spread her salary over the calendar year.
Archibald's second possible explanation is that, even though faculty appreciate the need to take pay over the first nine months, they also know that they-like Strotzlack the willpower required to do so successfully. Using natural experiment evidence from the College of William and Mary, Archibald finds stronger support for the selfimposed constraint theory than for the notion that budgetary and transaction costs devour any possible interest earnings derived from frontloaded pay.
In addition, Graham and Isaac (2002) admit the possibility of bounded rationality.
That is, they follow Thaler (1994) and speculate that the optimization problem faced by college faculty may simply be too hard for even highly educated individuals to solve. As Hirshleifer (2001) points out, such circumstances occasion the need for some form of heuristic simplification.
Using evidence from a survey of 109 of their peers at American University, Graham and Isaac (2002) find that faculty behave in a manner much more consistent with behavioral economics than with the simple prediction of rational expectations. Graham and Isaac are careful to point out that insuring oneself today against how one may behave tomorrow does not constitute irrational behavior. In their words, " [t] he dispute concerns the constitution of rationality, not the fact of rationality" (p. 399).
III. Data and Hypothesis Testing
A. Data
Our hypothesis testing and analysis employs two unique data sets. The first consists of data received in response to requests mailed directly to public university payroll staff and Freedom of Information officers. We requested information regarding payment schedule choices for each university as a whole, as well as-in particular-its accounting, finance, and economics departments. The requests were sent to twelve public universities in the upper Midwest where economics, finance, and accounting faculty could be uniquely identified. Geographic proximity to our institution was a key factor in determining which schools received the requests. The total number of faculty included in the data set is 6,442. Table 1 lists the schools that responded. Figure 1 groups economics, accounting, and finance faculty together and compares them to all other faculty members. The figure shows that economists, at 54.61%, most frequently choose the nine-month payment option relative to the twelve-month. Finance faculty members were not far behind, with 51.46% choosing the nine-month option. In contrast, only 38.81% of accountants chose the nine-month payment option-considerably less than economics and finance faculty.
About 38.69% of all other faculty members chose the nine-month option as opposed to 61.31% that chose the twelve-month option. The data are presented in Table 2 .
B. Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis 1
We test the following hypotheses in this section. First, we test the null hypothesis that university faculty uniformly make their academic pay distribution choice in accord with the prediction of rational expectations. That is, we test the null hypothesis that Π ALL = 1, where Π represents the proportion receiving their pay over nine months. Since the fraction of all faculty in the data set that select the nine-month option is only .3916, we easily reject the null hypothesis in favor of a behavioral alternative.
Hypothesis 2
Second, we test whether individuals who presumably possess more knowledge or expertise know better what to do with their assets. We conduct this test across two dimensions. First, we consider whether there is heterogeneity among faculty related to their specific fields of academic expertise. In this case, we consider the null hypothesis that Π PVFIELDS = Π OTHER ; that is, we test the null that the fraction of faculty paid over nine months in the fields that pay most attention the concept of present value-economics, accounting, and finance-is not different from the fraction of other faculty who do so.
Calculation of the appropriate test statistic, distributed as a z, yields a value of 3.15.
Hence, the null is easily rejected, giving evidence that individuals with more expertise may indeed know better what to do with their assets.
Hypothesis 3
Next, we conduct a related test for differences among the three disciplines. Our null hypothesis here is the joint null that Π ECON = Π FINANCE = Π ACCTING . Rejection of the null would imply significant discipline-specific differences among the three groups, perhaps suggesting the faculty in economics and finance understand better the time value of money than do their accounting counterparts. The appropriate test statistic of the joint null, distributed as a χ 2 with two degrees of freedom, is 7.70, which permits rejection of the joint null hypothesis at the α = 0.05 level of significance. The fraction of accounting faculty that receive their pay over 9 months (.3881) is small enough compared to their finance (.5146) and economics (.5461) counterparts that we conclude that the differences among these fractions are not due to chance alone.
Hypothesis 4
Finally, we conduct an "IQ" test among institutions. That is, we consider whether faculty differ in their pay distribution choice across institutions of varying academic reputation. If, on average, more intelligent individuals are drawn to more prestigious academic institutions, then one could reasonably expect that a greater fraction of faculty at top institutions opt to receive their pay sooner rather than later. reject the null hypothesis of no difference between faculty at the two institution types.
C. Preliminary Conclusions
In this section of the paper we have conducted several empirical hypothesis tests surrounding two central ideas of behavioral economics. First, we examined whether faculty with nine-month academic contracts receive their pay over nine months, finding that they significantly opt to receive their pay over twelve rather than nine months.
Second, we probed whether there are significant differences among faculty depending upon proxies for their specific knowledge, expertise, and intelligence. Here our proxies were academic discipline and institutional type. In both cases we found significant differences.
Of course, our analysis is limited inasmuch as we offer little in the way of any control variables. Since we obtained our data via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), universities could not tell us more about specific individuals than what the institutions are obligated to supply as public information. In order to control for other variables, and to test the robustness of our results, we gathered an additional set of data using a web-based survey. We describe those data and our tests for robustness below.
IV. Data and Tests for Robustness
While we have thus far been able to reject all null hypotheses in favor of behavioral alternatives, we have not controlled for any other factors that may influence a faculty member's pay frequency decision. Hence, in this section, we test the robustness of our results once we have controlled for other possible individual-specific factors that could influence a professor's choice.
We subsequently conducted a web-based survey of faculty in public universities in Michigan in order to obtain information regarding individual-specific factors related to our research question. Using e-mail, we contacted a randomly-chosen sample of faculty from nine universities. We selected these institutions because they are large enough that we were able to identify uniquely professors of accounting, economics, and finance.
We had previously telephoned human resource departments at these and other public universities in Michigan to determine whether their faculty indeed have the option to receive their pay over nine or twelve months. Three of the institutions we contactedMichigan State University, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and Wayne State University-stated that they did not offer the option.
The email message contained a link to the survey web page, depicted in Figure 2 .
The survey was sent to a total of 662 faculty members. There were 180 survey responses, giving a survey response rate of approximately 27 percent. Refer to Table 3 for a summary of the responses. Of those 180 responses, only 155 could be used for the data analysis because they either did not fully complete the survey or they had calendar-year contracts instead of academic-year contracts (e.g., department chairs).
The dependent variable, TWELVEMONTH t , indicates whether a faculty member chooses the nine-or twelve-month pay option. If she chooses the twelve-month pay option, the dependent variable is one; the variable equals zero otherwise. We estimate a total of three specifications of our logit regression model that takes the general form
where x is a vector of individual-specific characteristics that may influence an individual's paycheck disbursement choice.
In all specifications of the model we included variables indicating both faculty rank and area of academic expertise. For faculty rank, we included three dummy variables: ASST t , ASSOC t , and PROF t . Each takes a value of one if a faculty member holds the rank of assistant, associate, or full professor, respectively. Individuals who fall outside of all these categories may include lecturers and instructors.
For area of expertise, we again included three dummy variables: ACCT t , ECON t , and FINANCE t . Each takes a value of one if a faculty member defines her primary area of expertise as accounting, economics, or finance, respectively. Individuals who fall outside of all these categories include those teaching in other disciplines.
In our first specification we also included all variables our survey would permit.
These were all 0-1 dummies designed to capture factors beyond academic rank (presumably also related to age) and area of expertise that might influence an individual's The high significance of the overall regression, combined with the low levels of significance of several our variables, led us to suspect that the model may have been overspecified. After preliminary testing confirmed our suspicion, we respecified the model in the following way. First, we reduced our faculty rank variables to two: ASST t (defined as before) and SENIOR t , a variable that equals one if a faculty member holds either the rank of associate or full professor. SENIOR t equals zero otherwise. Our thinking was that senior faculty may be older, have tenure, and-as a result-face a different optimization problem than their junior counterparts.
Second, we also reduced our academic area variables to two. Since finance is a subfield of economics, we pooled ECON t and FINANCE t to create the ECONFIN t variable. ECONFIN t takes a value of one if a faculty member considers her primary area of expertise to be either economics or finance, and equals zero otherwise.
Finally, we dropped PRIMINC t , and MARHOUSE t , from the equation since there appeared to be a collinear relationship among PRIMINC t , MARRY t , and MARHOUSE t .
Our results appear in the second column of Table 4 Table 4 .
In this final version, the regression exhibits the greatest level of significance.
Both of the faculty rank variables are again significant at the α = 0.05 level or better. The expected relationship among the rank variables is preserved, although their estimated coefficients are not significantly different from each other. Both of the academic subject variables bear the expected sign and appear significant at either the α = 0.1 or α = 0.05 levels. The CHILD t variable is again significant at the α = 0.05 level in the expected direction. While insignificant, the estimated coefficients of both MASTER'S t and MARRY t nevertheless bear the expected sign.
V. Conclusions
Our paper considers empirically two key hypotheses of the literature of behavioral economics. First, we test the null hypothesis that individuals behave, on average, in a manner more consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis than with the idea of self-control in the face of hyperbolic discounting in their saving decisions. Second, we examine whether individuals exhibit Herbert Simon's notion that the goal formation of individuals will differ depending upon their relative levels of experience and knowledge.
Using data from public universities, we examine these hypotheses in light of the decisions made by university faculty concerning whether to (1) receive their academicyear pay in the first nine months or (2) spread their pay over the entire calendar year.
Our evidence is more consistent with the behavioral literature than with rational expectations. Further, individual-specific factors such as academic field and faculty rank are significant predictors. In particular, professors in economics and finance are significantly more likely to receive their pay sooner. We also find that individuals with children are significantly more likely to receive their pay over twelve months.
Hirshleifer (2001) catalogs a variety of judgment and decision biases, including the status quo bias-the tendency for an individual to prefer the default option among alternatives. Hence, the current paper could be extended to control for the manner in which pay options are presented to faculty at each institution, or how cumbersome making a switch might be. Unfortunately, measuring accurately and consistently the difficulty of making a payroll change across so many different institutions may be extremely problematic. An additional line of research could consider to what extent there might be a wealth or income effect since accounting, finance, and economics faculty are among the highest income earners within academia. Prob > χ 2 = 0.0069 z-statistics given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
